Author – Lyudvig Khachatryan
Analysis of the 2026 elections
The 2026 elections to the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia (RA) took place in an exceptionally complex geopolitical environment. The period was marked by the loss of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) as a result of the Armenian-Azerbaijani war, which had grave consequences for Armenia, and by the forced displacement of its indigenous Armenian population, as well as by a number of simultaneous international and regional armed conflicts and crises, in particular the Russian-Ukrainian, Israeli-Iranian and American-Iranian wars. These circumstances had a significant impact on Armenia’s domestic political agenda, on public sentiment and on the electoral process, creating a distinctive political and security context for the elections.
In Washington, on 8 August 2025, a joint declaration was signed through the mediation of the President of the United States of America (USA). Within its framework, the initialling of the text of the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan was also recorded; the agreement provided for arrangements aimed at restoring regional communications.
Within the framework of these arrangements, a transport/connectivity project called the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” is planned, linking Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan through the territory of Armenia. Apart from other possible structures, it will mainly include railway infrastructure. According to published information, the railway is expected to operate under conditions that preserve the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the Republic of Armenia; however, it seems that no information has yet been published on what options actually exist to ensure this, in terms of the technical and logistical design work. It is also assumed that one possible outcome of the agreement may be the lifting of Armenia’s transport blockade and the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border.
Before the elections, on 9 February 2026, the US Vice President visited the Republic of Armenia. On 26 May 2026, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio paid a short visit to Armenia. During the visit, important documents were signed at Zvartnots Airport with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, Ararat Mirzoyan.
Before the elections, on 28 May 2026, the US President published a post with the following content: “Nikol has my UNRESERVED and COMPLETE support for re-election on 7 June 2026.”
Before the elections, on 4–5 May 2026, three high-level events took place in Yerevan: the summit of the European Political Community, the state visit of French President Emmanuel Macron, and the “Yerevan Dialogue” international conference.
Before the elections, on 1 April 2026, during the meeting in Moscow between the President of the Russian Federation and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, the Russian President addressed the following public remarks to the RA Prime Minister. Quoted from https://www.primeminister.am/hy/press-release/item/2026/04/01/Nikol-Pashinyan-Vladimir-Putin/:
“Let it be said from the outset that being in a customs union with the European Union and being in the EAEU at the same time is impossible. It is simply impossible.”
“And, by the way, today, thanks to your efforts and those of the President of Azerbaijan, I believe it has been possible to reach the level of stabilising relations, and the US President also took an active part in this. And, in my opinion, the transport routes are also being unblocked, and so on. Here one simply needs to look for ways to strengthen relations further. But it seems to me that here, too, a full stop should be put, and it would be better if this did not become part of the domestic political process, especially during the election campaign.”
“And there are many political forces that hold pro-Russian positions. Of course, I will tell you openly: the dialogue between us is such that we always speak honestly and directly. We would very much like all these political parties and politicians to be able to take part in this domestic political work during the elections. Some of them, I know, are in places of detention, despite the fact that they hold Russian passports.”
The circumstances described above may have influenced the content of campaigning and the shaping of voters’ political preferences, since they were widely covered and spread by the mass media. Moreover, these circumstances were actively used as justifications and political arguments by the main political forces taking part in the election campaign.
In this context, the question arises of how both the external and the domestic political processes of the Republic of Armenia may develop. On the one hand, there is the West’s support for the sovereignty, security and democratic development of the Republic of Armenia, including public political support for the current authorities. On the other hand, Armenia remains under significant economic influence, as well as some political and security influence, of the Russian Federation.
Under these conditions, the question arises of how far the problems of ensuring the security and sovereignty of the Republic of Armenia have been solved, and what developments can be expected in Armenia’s treaty-based and institutional relations with the Russian Federation, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). For assessing the security environment, it is also important that a military base of the Russian Federation is stationed in the Republic of Armenia, ensuring Russia’s military presence in the South Caucasus.
At the same time, if the military-political contradictions between the West and Russia, including the conflict over the war in Ukraine, are not resolved in the near future, the influence of competition between external power centres on Armenia’s foreign-policy balance, security policy and economic development will probably remain an important factor affecting the country’s strategic decisions.
The Republic of Armenia has only land borders and borders only four countries: Georgia, Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkey. For years Armenia has been in conflict with the last two; although some steps have been taken at government level to normalise relations, a final and lasting settlement of the disagreements has not yet been achieved. At the same time, the further course of regional and global geopolitical developments is still difficult to predict.
A number of problems related to ensuring the security of the Republic of Armenia remain unresolved. They depend both on further developments in international and regional geopolitical processes and on possible political, social and institutional developments within Armenia. Consequently, the prospects for strengthening security and sovereignty continue to depend on the combined effect of external and internal factors.
Given the uncertainty of geopolitical processes, as well as the unpredictability of possible domestic political developments in Armenia and their consequences, the chances of overcoming the challenges facing Armenia in the coming years and ensuring sustainable development are hard to assess as simple or clear-cut. These challenges may become even more complex if political leaders or political actors are guided in their activities primarily by their own political or personal interests and ambitions, which do not always coincide with the long-term interests of the state. Let us note that these interests do not always coincide with the expectations of broad sections of society either, especially when those expectations were formed under the influence of propaganda promoting irrational approaches. Unfortunately, it was also as a result of the incorrect assessment of the situation by those who held the helm of power in the Republic of Armenia from the second half of 1990 onward, and of the irrational public expectations that had formed, that Nagorno-Karabakh was emptied of its Armenian population.
In this context, it must also be taken into account that in Armenia, in the region and in some countries that are important geopolitical players, a sufficient level of democratic political culture, stability of state institutions and civilisational development has not yet fully formed. This creates additional uncertainty both for regional security and for Armenia’s long-term strategic development in conditions of peace.
At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the policies of international actors are mainly shaped by their own national interests, security priorities and the strategic goals of the given period. The foreign policy of the United States is determined by US interests and the priorities of its administration, and the policy of the European Union by the combined positions of its member states. At the same time, the European Union has serious political and security contradictions with the Russian Federation. Russia’s policy, too, is shaped within the framework of its own state interests and the strategic approaches of its current leadership.
The political positions of the other actors in the region are likewise determined by their national and regional interests, and they may change depending on geopolitical developments and shifts in international relations.
This situation influenced the programmes and foreign-policy positions of the political forces taking part in the elections in the Republic of Armenia and, through them, the shaping of voters’ political preferences. Consequently, both the domestic political environment and the foreign-policy and security environment of this period played a substantial role in shaping voters’ decisions and the results of the vote.
In this context, developments in the Republic of Armenia’s relations with its international partners were of great importance.
Particular attention should be paid to the US–Armenia agreements and to France’s expressed support for Armenia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, economic development and the continuity of democratic reforms. The political approaches of France’s leadership and the steps aimed at deepening the strategic partnership between the two countries, which contributed to the expansion of Armenian-French cooperation, also played an important role, as did the prospects for cooperation with the European Union and its member states.
Also significant were the intergovernmental agreements and planned initiatives aimed at developing cooperation with India, Iran, China and other states, which influenced the expectations formed about Armenia’s foreign-policy and security environment.
Political decisions may also have been influenced by the assessments of Russia’s role held by different sections of society and by security concerns arising from regional developments.
No less important are relations with Iran in the current geopolitical situation, further expectations regarding the settlement of the conflict with Turkey and Azerbaijan and the dangers expected from them, and relations with Georgia.
At the same time, voters’ political preferences were also significantly influenced by the forced displacement of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh and by the unresolved issue of Armenian prisoners of war and other persons held in Azerbaijan.
It should be noted that voters were also influenced by measures to solve social problems, by the positions taken on corruption, by the publication by state bodies of exposed corruption cases, and by statements about cases of abuse of administrative resources.
Although the referendum that adopted the current RA Constitution can hardly be regarded as a process carried out through fraud-free procedures, nevertheless, since the relevant article of the Constitution corresponds to the above requirement of the Declaration, the electoral principles are presented below in accordance with the provisions of that article of the Constitution.
According to Article 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, “Elections to the National Assembly and to the councils of elders of communities, as well as referendums, shall be held on the basis of universal, equal, free and direct suffrage, by secret ballot.”
The 2026 National Assembly elections were held on the basis of universal suffrage. According to official data published by the Central Electoral Commission, 58.9% of all registered voters took part in the vote. Given that a significant part of the officially registered voters actually lives outside the Republic of Armenia and usually does not take part in elections, this turnout can be regarded as relatively high.
In terms of equal suffrage, all citizens had an equal right to vote. At the same time, the risks of pressure on voters, administrative influence or offers of vote-buying bribes could, in theory, have affected any voter. However, the existing electoral mechanisms, in particular the procedures that ensure the secrecy of the ballot, enabled voters to vote according to their own will, regardless of outside influence or of whether they had received a bribe.
The candidates could not have had equal opportunities from the outset, above all because of the position they held on the party list. It would be wrong to assume that their opportunities could have been equal in terms of intellectual, physical, financial, administrative, socio-economic and oratorical abilities, mastery of campaign technologies, the resources and capabilities of the political forces supporting them, or mastery and use of the mechanisms for influencing voters.
The elections were free in the sense that everyone had the opportunity to express their political position and views freely. At the same time, during the election campaign, hate speech, mutual insults and accusations against one another reached unprecedented levels. Numerous statements, accusations and even threats concerning abuse of administrative resources, distribution of vote-buying bribes and foreign interference circulated widely. Numerous arrests were also made on the basis of vote-buying accusations.
Some campaigners conducted the election campaign with rude and unpleasant behaviour, showing a low level of decency and good manners. Politicians often used hate speech and improper, insulting and sometimes even obscene language toward one another. This happened not only during the election campaign but also earlier, in the work of the National Assembly. It is therefore hard to expect the culture of political communication to improve substantially in the newly elected National Assembly, since the line-up of the main political actors has not changed substantially.
The principle of direct suffrage means that citizens express their political will directly, by taking part in the electoral process and electing a candidate directly. At the same time, legal literature also accepts the view that direct suffrage is preserved when citizens vote for a party’s electoral list, that is, for a group of candidates as a whole. In this sense, it can be said that elections to the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia also correspond to the principle of direct suffrage, with certain reservations and perhaps not fully, since the current electoral system is aimed more at choosing the country’s leader, and parliament is formed mainly on the basis of the votes cast for the candidates for prime minister.
The conditions for a secret ballot were, on the whole, ensured. All the main procedures provided for by the current Electoral Code were applied during the vote.
The problems of proper and impartial registration of voter participation, of voting in place of another person, and of preventing the ballot “carousel” have essentially been solved. Each voter was first identified with an electronic (fingerprint) matching device and then signed the voter list.
After identification, the voter received an envelope and one ballot paper for each political force taking part in the elections, went alone into the voting booth, made their choice, put the ballot of the chosen political force into the envelope, and left the remaining ballots in the box provided in the booth. Then, at the ballot box, a commission member stuck a self-adhesive stamp on the part of the ballot left outside the envelope for that purpose, after which the voter dropped the envelope into the ballot box.
This mechanism is organised so that members of the electoral commission, observers and other persons cannot find out how a voter voted.
The secrecy of the ballot could be called into question only in cases such as improper arrangement of the voting booths, forcing a voter to photograph their ballot, revealing a voter’s choice by technical means, or compelling a voter to show their choice. In such cases, however, members of the precinct electoral commissions, proxies or observers draw up the relevant reports, and no evidence of such cases has been published.
An attempt was made at the Constitutional Court to substantiate the claim that the envelopes were see-through, but the court did not consider it proven.
It should be stressed that today in the Republic of Armenia voters’ ballots, as a rule, are not falsified, and the officially recorded voting results largely reflect the will expressed by voters.
The openness and transparency of the elections were, on the whole, ensured. To reduce or rule out the possibility of secret or uncontrolled alteration of the results, representatives of the political forces represented in the National Assembly are included in the precinct electoral commissions; the presence of observers and media representatives is ensured; polling stations are video-recorded; votes are counted publicly; and the protocols of the voting results are given to proxies and observers and published on the official website of the Central Electoral Commission. Where complaints are filed, recounts are also carried out.
During the organisation and conduct of the elections, some organisational and technical problems were recorded. They concerned the organisation of the work of the territorial and precinct electoral commissions, the training of commission members, and the proper implementation of certain electoral procedures.
Some numerical discrepancies between the preliminary and final results were recorded. Such cases may be due both to technical failures and to human errors made during data entry. They may point to the need to further improve the organisation and administration of electoral processes, but on their own they cannot be sufficient grounds for declaring the election results invalid as a whole without relevant and convincing evidence.
The level of the country’s governability during the elections was, on the whole, adequate, and the system of public administration continued to function normally.
The question of the fairness of the elections was debated even before voting day, and in the post-election period it became, and will remain, one of the key topics on the political agenda.
The concept of fair elections is not limited to fraud-free voting at polling stations and correct counting of votes. It covers the entire electoral process, from the election campaign to the summing-up of the final results and the formation of public trust in them.
Almost none of the political forces that took part in the vote, whether they entered parliament or remained outside it, assessed the electoral process as fully fair, free and transparent. Even the political forces that entered the National Assembly accused one another of obtaining votes through vote-buying, abusing administrative resources and exerting unlawful influence on the electoral process.
This shows that an atmosphere of mutual distrust about the fairness of the elections has formed among political actors. Although the Constitutional Court gave a legal assessment of the challenges to the election results and their lawfulness, it can be assumed that the political distrust of the electoral process has not been fully overcome and remains one of the characteristic features of the post-election political environment. The public assessments and statements of political forces also help to sustain this distrust.
The question of the legitimacy (lawfulness) of the National Assembly may be assessed differently by different political forces and social groups, depending on their political positions and their assessments of the electoral process. Opposition political forces, as well as some political forces not represented in parliament, may question the legitimacy of the election results, pointing in particular to the fact that the voting results at three polling stations were declared invalid and no repeat vote was held at those stations.
The key question in assessing the legitimacy of a representative body formed through elections is how far the final results reflect the genuine will of voters. To answer it, one must assess whether there were cases of vote falsification, what their possible scale and impact on the final results were, and whether there is sufficient factual evidence to support such claims.
One of the most important conditions for the legitimacy of elections is ensuring the secrecy of the ballot and citizens’ actual ability to make a free and independent choice, without unlawful influence, pressure or control. The secrecy of the ballot appears to have been ensured at all polling stations.
In terms of legitimacy, particular attention should also be paid to the fact that the voting results at three polling stations were declared invalid, and the number of citizens who voted at those stations amounted to about 0.23 percent of all voters who took part in the election.
If, using a purely notional calculation, we take elections held entirely without violations and without any polling station’s results being declared invalid as a notional benchmark of 100 percent legitimacy, then, based solely on the share of voters whose votes were not counted, this figure can be expressed as 99.77 percent. However, this number is not a legally or scientifically established measure of legitimacy. It is merely a notional mathematical ratio showing what share of all voters voted at polling stations whose results were later excluded from the calculation of seat allocation. This figure should therefore not be equated with a real measure of the overall legitimacy of the elections, but it can form one partial element in assessing legitimacy.
Nevertheless, in accordance with legal requirements, the votes cast at the polling stations declared invalid did not take part in the final allocation of seats. In other words, the will of those voters was not reflected in the final results, regardless of whether those votes would have changed the allocation of seats.
Therefore, even if cancelling the results of those three polling stations did not change the final political outcome of the elections, this in itself is grounds for stating that the electoral process was not entirely flawless.
At the same time, the assessment of the legitimacy of the elections cannot be limited to the statements of political forces. It must also be considered in the context of voters’ general attitude, public trust in the electoral process and public acceptance of the election results.
The experience of previous elections shows that when a significant part of society was convinced that electoral violations or vote rigging had taken place, and those claims were backed by sufficient factual data, large-scale public protest movements often emerged. In the case of these elections, however, no large-scale public protest or mass street movement over electoral fraud was recorded.
When political forces accuse one another of an unfair electoral process but at the same time accept the mandates they received, take part in the work of the National Assembly and exercise all the rights provided by law, a question arises not only of legal but also of political and moral consistency. The same observation may also apply to political forces that did not pass the threshold for entering parliament but, where the conditions set by law are met, continue to receive state funding.
Since National Assembly elections in the Republic of Armenia are held under a proportional system, the question of the legitimacy of the elections concerns not individual deputies or political forces but the formation of the National Assembly as a whole and its correspondence to the freely expressed will of voters.
Based on the voting results of the 2026 elections, the seats in the National Assembly were distributed among three political forces.
It should be noted that the electoral list of the “Civil Contract” (CC) party, headed by the Prime Minister, was formed on the basis of the results of individual voting held at the party congress.
At the same time, under a proportional system, where voters can give their single vote to the electoral list of one political force, the vote is in practice often also perceived as an expression of the voter’s attitude toward the politician heading that list and the political direction they represent.
Eighteen political forces took part in the elections. They included both the political force representing the current government and parties and alliances of various opposition orientations, some of which relied on the participation of individuals or political groups with significant financial and economic resources. Some political forces emphasised deepening relations with Russia in their foreign-policy positions, while the current government emphasised, to some extent, the development of Armenia’s relations with Western partners and other states.
Seats were won by the political force headed by the Prime Minister and by two of the three main opposition forces. One of them, the Strong Armenia alliance of parties, had been formed in the period before the elections with the participation of various political and public figures. The other was the Armenia alliance of parties, headed by the second President of the Republic of Armenia. The third major opposition force, the “Prosperous Armenia” party, did not win any seats in parliament.
On the assumption that the votes of citizens who took part in the elections were not substantially distorted at the polling stations, and that the published results on the whole reflect voters’ political preferences, the following observations can be made on the basis of the published data.
Voting for the political force headed by the Prime Minister may have been driven by various factors. They include expectations of maintaining peace, voters’ views on the country’s foreign-policy direction, attitudes toward the former authorities, security concerns, and assessments of socio-economic changes affecting citizens.
According to the voting results, about 86 percent of the citizens who took part in the election voted for four main political forces, led by four key political figures. The political force headed by the Prime Minister received about 49.3 percent of the votes of those who voted, and the three main opposition forces together about 36.8 percent. The remaining 14 political forces together received about 12.7 percent of the votes. Invalid ballots made up about 1.1 percent, and recorded numerical discrepancies about 0.1 percent.
If we look at the distribution of votes in terms of foreign-policy orientation, notionally separating political forces with a Western orientation from those in favour of deepening relations with Russia, the published results show that the total support for the forces attributed to the first group exceeded the votes received by the second, pro-Russian group.
Issues related to the course of the vote, its results and the decisions taken on them are presented below through the relevant analyses, assessments and conclusions.
Eighteen political forces took part in the elections. According to the published official data, out of 2,005 polling stations, the most votes were received:
– at 1,881 polling stations by the “Civil Contract” party,
– at 94 polling stations by the Strong Armenia alliance of parties,
– at 13 polling stations by the Armenia alliance of parties,
– at 8 polling stations by the “Prosperous Armenia” party,
– at 7 polling stations by the “Wings of Unity” party,
– at 1 polling station by the “For the Republic” Alliance of Defenders of Democracy party,
– at 1 polling station by the “Bright Armenia” party.
Given the modern conditions under which the electoral process is organised, the possibilities for monitoring voting procedures and the multi-layered oversight of vote counting, it can be stated that the procedural safeguards of the electoral process have improved significantly compared with earlier periods.
However, it was recorded that at one polling station the ballots of one of the political forces were missing, and at two other polling stations voting continued considerably beyond the set time because the polling stations were not closed on time. As a result, the voting results at these polling stations were declared invalid.
These cases show that, although substantial progress has been made in ensuring the transparency of voting and vote counting, problems still remain in the organisation of the electoral process, and solving them could further increase the effectiveness of the electoral system and public trust in it.
Some problems in organising the elections are also shown by the differences recorded between the preliminary data published by the Central Electoral Commission and the data in the polling station protocols, as well as by the recounts carried out at 637 of the 2,005 polling stations and the corrections made as a result.
It is a positive fact that the current system provides legal and practical means for recounting votes and correcting recorded data. At the same time, individual numerical discrepancies, and the lack of sufficient explanations for them in the protocols, show that the organisation of the work of precinct electoral commissions and the data-processing procedures need further improvement.
The manual entry, at the territorial level, of the figures recorded in the precinct electoral commission protocols into computer systems may in some cases have caused numerical discrepancies in the preliminary results published by the Central Electoral Commission. This shows that the control mechanisms for transmitting, entering and checking data need continuous improvement, so as to minimise the influence of the human factor.
At the same time, the differences between the published data and the figures recorded in the precinct commission protocols give grounds to discuss the need to further improve the digital processing of election results, automated data checking and information transmission systems.
It can be assumed that it is technically possible and practically feasible to develop a standard format for polling station result protocols that would allow all the figures in a protocol to be recognised automatically by software, through scanning or machine reading, and recorded directly in the computer system without manual entry.
Such a solution would allow territorial electoral commissions to compile each polling station’s results automatically and calculate their totals, and then, on the same principle, to obtain the nationwide summary results of the elections from the protocols of all polling stations in the country. At the same time, the software could run automatic logical and arithmetic checks, immediately detecting possible discrepancies or errors, which would help improve the accuracy of the results, the speed of processing and public trust in the electoral process.
As a result of violations of the requirements of the Electoral Code, the voting results at three polling stations were declared invalid by decision of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). This led to changes in the final numerical results of the elections. The situation raises a number of questions, in particular to what extent these changes affected the final results, and whether the current legal regulations are clear enough to assess and resolve the consequences of such cases.
The issue was all the more sensitive because one of the political forces was right on the borderline of the electoral threshold, failing to pass it by a difference of thousandths of a percent.
In this context, the question also arises: if the results of those three polling stations had been included in the overall count, that is, if the votes declared invalid had been included with the appropriate corrections and the overall turnout figures recalculated, would the “Prosperous Armenia” party (PAP) have passed the set electoral threshold?
No calculation answering this question, presented in a complete form accessible to the public and clearly showing the possible effect of the three polling stations’ results on the allocation of seats, has been published. At the same time, it should be noted that, by decision of the Constitutional Court, the decision of the Central Electoral Commission under which PAP did not receive seats remained in force.
It should be borne in mind that all numerical data relating to the electoral process are available to the public in the manner set by law. This enables independent experts, political forces and other interested parties to carry out additional analyses, recalculations and assessments.
Regardless of the decisions taken by the Central Electoral Commission and the Constitutional Court, a full assessment of the electoral process required answers to the following key questions.
1. Were voters’ ballots falsified, and if so, to what extent? It is necessary to establish whether there is factual evidence of such cases, at which polling stations they were recorded, and through what mechanisms possible violations could have been carried out.
2. Were any discrepancies recorded between the number of ballots or ballot envelopes in the ballot boxes and the number of people who actually voted? The number of voters who took part must be compared with the signatures on the voter lists and with the electronic registration data. It is also necessary to assess whether the data on the envelopes and ballots in the ballot boxes are consistent with the established procedures.
3. Were there cases of voting in place of other persons? Such possibilities are now significantly limited by identity-verification mechanisms that use passport data and electronic (biometric) identification. At the same time, the published voter-turnout data make it possible to check for possible numerical mismatches.
4. Were there cases of incorrect or fraudulent vote counting? In assessing this, it is important to bear in mind that precinct electoral commissions include representatives of different political forces, and the result protocols are signed by commission members. If significant violations had occurred during the count, they should have been reflected in the relevant protocols. At the same time, if such cases did occur, it is necessary to establish their number, the polling stations concerned and their impact on the final results.
5. Were any violations of ballot secrecy recorded? It is necessary to establish whether such cases occurred, the reports drawn up about them and the possible mechanisms. When assessing whether ballot secrecy was ensured, it must be borne in mind that representatives of different political forces are present at polling stations, and the voter is able to choose a ballot independently and place it in the envelope.
6. Were deliberate violations recorded during vote counting? The likelihood of such cases is reduced by the vote-counting procedures, the possibility of video recording, the involvement of different commission members, and the presence of proxies and observers. Nevertheless, if such cases were recorded, they must be assessed on the basis of facts and specific data.
7. Let us note that, judging by the turnout data published by polling station every three hours, there no longer seem to be any recorded cases of voting that exceeds a polling station’s throughput capacity.
In the process of summing up the results of the 2026 parliamentary elections and taking further decisions based on them, a situation arose that gave rise to legal, political and public debate about whether the elections were fair.
From a comparison of the published preliminary data and the electoral figures, it seemed clear that the votes received by the “Prosperous Armenia” party (PAP), founded by the richest person in Armenia, were not enough to pass the threshold set by law.
Calculations based on the final data published after the recount allow the conclusion that, even if the voting results at the three polling stations had not been declared invalid, PAP’s votes would most likely still not have been enough to pass the threshold. In other words, according to the available calculations, including the results of those three polling stations would not by itself have changed the proportions of the seat allocation.
Therefore, if there had been data supporting the opposite conclusion, it would have been necessary to present detailed numerical calculations based on the polling station protocols and to submit them to the Constitutional Court as well. Those calculations should have made it possible to show that it was precisely the invalidation of the voting results at the three polling stations that was the decisive reason PAP did not receive seats.
At the same time, it must be taken into account that the political forces taking part in the elections had the opportunity to examine the polling station protocols, study the figures by polling station published by the Central Electoral Commission, monitor the voting, record possible violations, and review the video recordings.
This is especially important because, when election results are challenged, the objections raised by political forces and their representatives should be based as far as possible on specific polling station data, protocols and verifiable calculations.
At the same time, a serious shortcoming in the organisation of the electoral process is the fact that the territorial and central electoral commissions did not detect and prevent in time situations in which the ballots of one political force were missing at one polling station, and at two other polling stations the legally set deadlines for ending the vote and closing the station were not observed. It was precisely these circumstances that served as grounds for the CEC, as required by law, to declare the voting results at those three polling stations invalid. Interestingly, the question of invalidity was not resolved by the relevant Territorial Electoral Commissions within the time limits set by law.
The violations of legal requirements thus served as the legal basis for declaring the voting results at those polling stations invalid. The question is whether the violations were intentional.
Had the Central Electoral Commission ordered a repeat vote at the three polling stations, its outcome, according to the calculations presented, could have affected the allocation of at most five seats.
Taking into account the seats reserved for national minorities, at least 100 of the total 105 seats could, according to a preliminary calculation, have been allocated in advance, before the results of the repeat vote were known, as follows:
“Civil Contract” party – 61 seats,
Strong Armenia alliance of parties – 28 seats,
Armenia alliance of parties – 11 seats.
If the calculation of the results of a possible repeat vote at the three polling stations had led to PAP passing the threshold set by law, then, according to the calculations presented, the party could have received at least four seats. The possibility of a fifth seat would, in turn, have depended on the final distribution of votes after the repeat vote and on the resulting calculation for reallocating seats.
The other political forces that did not receive seats would not, under the calculation scenarios presented, have reached the threshold needed for an additional seat.
In this context, a broader political question also arises: if the voters and political forces at the three invalidated polling stations had known that the votes to be recorded there could significantly affect the balance of votes, mainly between the Civil Contract and Prosperous Armenia parties, would their electoral behaviour have been the same? This question cannot be answered unambiguously, but it matters for how the legitimacy of the elections is perceived, not only legally but also politically and socially.
If, as a result of the repeat vote, PAP had not passed the threshold, then, according to the calculations presented, the maximum possible reallocation of seats could have been the one recorded by the Central Electoral Commission and upheld by the Constitutional Court. It is as follows:
“Civil Contract” party – 64 seats,
Strong Armenia alliance of parties – 29 seats,
Armenia alliance of parties – 12 seats.
In this scenario, the 64 seats allocated to the “Civil Contract” party exceed by one seat three-fifths of the National Assembly’s total of 105 seats, that is, 63 seats.
The Constitutional Court, on the basis of applications submitted by seven political forces, examined, in the manner set by law, the disputes concerning the decisions adopted on the election results.
With two judges recused, seven judges took part in examining the case.
Under Article 77 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, when resolving disputes related to the decision adopted on the results of National Assembly elections, the Constitutional Court may, in particular, adopt one of the following decisions:
Leave in force the decision adopted on the results of the National Assembly elections.
Declare invalid the decision adopted on the election results and:
declare the election results invalid,
declare the election results invalid and set the procedure for allocating seats,
call a second round of the elections.
Part 14 of the same article also provides that if the Constitutional Court, having exhausted all the means provided by law for obtaining evidence, is unable to establish the actual results of the elections, but the available reliable evidence shows that the electoral violations were organised, massive, repeated or periodic in nature, and taken together show a systemic interconnection that violated the principles of suffrage enshrined in Article 7 of the Constitution, the court is entitled to declare the election results invalid on that ground.
At the same time, if the Constitutional Court had declared the decision of the Central Electoral Commission invalid and found it necessary to carry out a new calculation, taking into account the invalidity of the voting results at the three polling stations, a legal mechanism would have had to be defined that reflected as fully as possible both the likely outcomes of seat allocation under the various possible numerical combinations of the will already expressed by voters in the invalidated votes, and, if necessary, the results of a possible repeat vote at those three polling stations.
However, the Constitutional Court left the decision of the Central Electoral Commission in force. As a result, the seats in the National Assembly were distributed among three political forces in the proportions set out above.
Different international actors assessed the elections differently.
Under these conditions, declaring the election results invalid could have created additional political and international uncertainty.
At the same time, representatives of many countries and international organisations congratulated the Prime Minister on the victory of the “Civil Contract” party and expressed their support for the Republic of Armenia. There were also opposing positions, including the absence of congratulations from the leaders of the Russian Federation and Belarus.
The fact that the official election results largely reflected the voting results, that the seats in the National Assembly were distributed accordingly, and that there was no public uprising, can be seen as an important indicator of the broad political acceptance of the election results by the public and of public acquiescence in them.
This is also supported by the fact that the political forces that took part in the elections and received seats in the National Assembly, even while having certain concerns about the legitimacy of the elections, on the whole accepted the results and the resulting allocation of seats.
The same applies, on the whole, to the other political forces that took part in the elections, except in cases where individual objections or challenges were submitted.
At the same time, such challenges mostly did not concern systemic inaccuracies in vote counting or in the recording of results by precinct commissions. They related mainly to other stages of the electoral process, chiefly campaigning, the conditions for exercising the right to vote, and concerns about the overall lawfulness of the elections.
The final political assessment of the 2026 elections also depends largely on the future work of the newly formed National Assembly, the quality of the decisions it adopts, the conditions for political competition that are maintained, and the relations that develop between the government and the opposition.
Therefore, the most balanced conclusion about the 2026 elections may be the following: according to the available data and the calculations based on them, the election results were not affected by violations that changed the basic allocation of seats; however, the problems recorded in the electoral process give grounds to regard them not as flawless, but as elections that were valid in their outcome while having certain legal, organisational and political problems.
To ensure the further civilisational development of the state, it is first necessary to solve the fundamental problems related to the existence, sovereignty and security of the state. In parallel and afterward, it is necessary to assess comprehensively how far the current Constitution, the judicial and legal system, public administration bodies, the electoral system, the education system and the general level of public awareness correspond to the goals of building a modern, law-based, democratic and effective state.
At the same time, it is necessary to assess the activities of the individuals and the state and public institutions on which the stability and development of the state system substantially depend, in order to determine how far their work contributes to building and strengthening law-based, democratic and effective public administration.
In this context, it is also crucial to determine whether society has a public circle with enough political, economic, professional and intellectual potential not only to take part in the development of the state but also to have a substantial influence on shaping state policy and the strategic directions of development.
Particular attention should be paid to whether the electoral system and electoral legislation correspond to the principles of equal, free and direct suffrage. The question arises of how far the genuine will of voters is reflected when, through each voter’s single vote, those who enter parliament are mainly candidates included in electoral lists drawn up by the leaders of political forces or by narrow circles.
It is also necessary to assess whether the current Electoral Code provides sufficient safeguards for organising and holding fair elections and for assessing the voting results as accurately as possible.
The need to improve electoral legislation is obvious, and the electoral system as a whole requires continuous reform.
The proportional system used in Armenia, under which voters mainly choose a political force’s list rather than individual candidates, does not fully ensure a composition of the National Assembly that best matches voters’ individual preferences.
At the same time, without substantially changing the current polling-station voting mechanism, solutions could be considered in which the people included in electoral lists and their order are determined through more open and participatory processes, for example through electronic preliminary intra-party votes (primaries). Such an approach could be seen as a step toward a more democratic and civilised electoral system.
It is worth discussing the possibility of applying electoral models that would reflect voters’ genuine preferences more fully. In particular, it is important to study systems under which a deputy’s mandate would depend largely on voters’ individual trust in the candidate and on the number of votes received.
The need to improve electoral legislation and the legal and political system emerged from the experience of previous elections, but the events of recent years have made it even more obvious.
To improve the electoral system, a number of key issues need to be discussed.
The rules on the formation and activities of parties and on ensuring their internal democracy need to be reviewed. It is important to discuss introducing mechanisms through which voters would have a greater role in forming party lists and ranking candidates.
It is necessary to assess whether the current rules fully solve the problem of calculating voting results accurately. If the percentages of votes received by political forces are calculated with the inaccuracies recorded in the electoral process also included, questions may arise as to whether this method reflects voters’ real preferences most accurately.
Inaccuracies may be caused both by technical or organisational problems and by errors made during the electoral process. It is therefore advisable to discuss an approach in which, for the purpose of allocating seats, the proportions of political forces are calculated solely from valid votes, taking into account only the choices actually expressed by voters, while assessing how far the inaccuracies could change the proportions of the seat allocation.
The legislation needs to define more clearly the mechanisms for assessing the possible impact of the results of invalidated polling stations on the final election results and on the allocation of seats.
Where such an assessment is left mainly to the Central Electoral Commission or the Constitutional Court, without clear mathematical and legal criteria set in advance, additional disputes and doubts may arise about whether the election results have been assessed fairly.
It is therefore advisable to develop predictable, transparent and verifiable procedures that, in any such situation, would allow the extent of the impact of invalidated polling stations to be assessed objectively and would ensure public trust in the electoral process.
The fairness and transparency of elections cannot be considered fully ensured if there are cases of vote-buying, abuse of administrative resources or unlawful influence on how voters express their will.
The risk of abuse of administrative and other resources may come both from representatives of state power and from organisations, businesses or economically influential individuals with large financial resources involved in electoral processes.
In this context, it is important to develop effective mechanisms that not only prohibit such actions but also ensure that they are prevented, detected and met with proportionate liability.
The problem is that if the law recognises certain actions as offences, but the mechanisms of liability for them do not work effectively enough in practice, a situation may arise in which the advantage gained through those offences is kept.
Especially under a proportional system, where voters vote mainly for political forces rather than individual candidates, it is possible that only individuals are held liable, while the political force within which the violation occurred continues to benefit from the advantage it produced.
Legal solutions should therefore be discussed that ensure not only individual liability but also effective protection of the principles of overall fairness of the electoral process and equal competition.
The institutional maturity of the judicial and legal system, the independence of judges and law-enforcement bodies, effective mechanisms for limiting corrupt influence and the real application of official accountability are important preconditions for strengthening democracy and building trust in electoral processes.
If the state system allows unlawful obedience to superiors, evasion of responsibility or decisions contrary to the public interest, this harms not only the effectiveness of justice but also trust in the entire system of public administration.
It is noteworthy that even when senior state officials speak about serious problems in the judicial and legal system, the effectiveness of the steps taken to solve those problems must also be assessed. For the sustainable development of public administration, it is important that reforms do not remain at the level of statements but deliver practical and long-term results.
Society’s socio-economic problems, the insufficient legal and political awareness of some voters, and their vulnerability to informational and manipulative influence may have some effect on the fairness of elections and on voters’ free expression of their will.
In such conditions, a voter’s decision may be shaped not only by political convictions but also, naturally, by economic dependence, disinformation, outside influence or other circumstances. This may weaken the fully competitive and democratic nature of the electoral process.
It is therefore necessary to pay great attention to the development of civic and political education. It is important for the education system to build knowledge about electoral processes, human rights, constitutional values, suffrage and civic responsibility, integrity and good manners.
The development of civic education can help raise voters’ legal awareness, build a culture of more informed choice and strengthen public trust in electoral processes.
I hope that geopolitical developments and the internal processes of the Republic of Armenia will move in a direction that helps to build and strengthen the country as a safe, independent, sovereign and peaceful state. At the same time, it is important that the existing problems related to the civilisational development of the state can be overcome, for the sake of the well-being, freedom and dignified life of the citizens living in Armenia.
To build a modern state, the system of public administration must reach a higher level of institutional and systemic development, in which citizens are able to form their own opinions freely, make decisions independently and solve their own life problems as independently as possible.
Civilisational progress can be expected when the effectiveness and accountability of those who hold power are driven by the demands of a conscious, legally aware and active civil society. The system of public administration must develop so that bureaucratic obstacles, corruption risks and opportunities for fraud are reduced to a minimum, and the political arena is dominated by relations based on knowledge, professional competence, responsibility and mutual respect.
It is also important to continue discussions on using modern technologies to reveal voters’ genuine preferences more fully and to improve electoral processes. The goal should be a system that not only provides the legal basis for forming the government but also increases public trust, reducing possible doubts about election results.
At the same time, it is necessary to discuss the possibility of introducing electoral systems under which deputies obtain their mandates to a greater extent on the basis of voters’ individual trust in the candidates and the number of votes they receive, while the representation of political forces in the National Assembly corresponds as closely as possible to their real political weight.
Such a system could help form a higher-quality and more legitimate representative government, ensuring more balanced representation of both majority and minority political forces. It could also help strengthen public trust in the government, the judiciary and local self-government bodies.
Given the possibilities of technological development, it is also advisable to study the introduction of hybrid systems that combine electronic and paper voting. Such an approach could combine the advantages of digital technology, such as fast and accurate vote counting and efficient data processing, while preserving the possibility of independent verification and recounting of the results through paper ballots.
The further development of the electoral system should aim not only at its technical improvement but also at creating a political and legal environment in which every citizen is confident that their vote is equally valuable. At the same time, the process of forming state power should reflect the genuine will of society as fully as possible, ensuring a high level of representativeness, fairness and democratic legitimacy, and should help build a system of public administration with high intellectual potential and professional quality, one that will not allow anyone to hold power for too long and, in a period of stagnation, even through no fault of their own, to lead the country into a catastrophic situation.