Armenia 2012 Parliamentary Elections: Six Conclusions from the Electronic Monitoring
Too many voters, impossible speeds, counts that went down, mismatches at 1,436 stations, 3.42% invalid ballots: the six findings of the first electronic monitoring.
Original page on electionscount.info: Conclusions and recommendations, 2012The May 2012 elections were the first that Lyudvig Khachatryan's team monitored electronically, within the Transparency International Anti-Corruption Center project. Their conclusions, as published on the site:
- Voter lists. In a number of communities the share of registered voters, and of voters who took part, in the population was abnormally high. See voters compared with the population and voter numbers before and after election day.
- Voting speed. The official 3-hourly turnout data showed many polling stations where each voter spent less time than registration requires. See polling station capacity.
- Falling counts. At some stations the cumulative number of voters went down from one report to the next. See the 20 stations.
- Mismatched numbers at 1,436 polling stations, at least 1.2% of all participants. See the analysis of voting numbers.
- Invalid ballots: 3.42% of participants.
- Signatures: the difference between signatures in the voter lists and participants was 0.9% of participants.
The same stations, again and again
The 2012 tables also allow a comparison with later votes. Station 37/30 reported 99.7% turnout in 2012 (1,011 of 1,014 voters), station 13/40 97.8% and station 23/59 97.6%. In the 2015 referendum the stations with the same numbers, in Nerkin Khndzoresk, Yerevan's Erebuni and Kut, were again among the highest-turnout stations in the country, at 97.63%, 100% and 93.90%. See the 2015 communities.
The recommendations
The proposals that followed, developed in the book, are the ones that later appeared in part in the 2016 Electoral Code: publish turnout and all election numbers by polling station as soon as they are known, publish signed voter lists, count every mismatch as an inaccuracy that can change the distribution of mandates, and register voters with technical equipment that rules out voting on behalf of others.
Data and sources on this site
From the book
This article is based on Chapters V and VI of Electoral Rights and Election Falsification by Lyudvig Khachatryan, which explains the full method, the formulas and the cases behind it.